While peace negotiations between warring states are nothing new in this modern era, the upcoming scheduled meeting planned between two heads of state, U.S. President Donald Trump and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, over how to end the current Russia-Ukraine War, is rather unique. In international affairs, this kind of not-all-hands-on-deck attempt is called unilateralism, and it is almost always an abysmal failure. The U.S., for example, under Trump, is treating Ukraine as if it is a U.S. client state incapable of fending for itself, either on the battlefield or in the boardroom to negotiate peace.
This U.S.-Russian summit (to occur this month without Ukraine) is scheduled even as fighting continues intensely along the front lines, with Russia targeting Ukrainian infrastructure. This differs from usual scenarios where peace talks might occur after a cessation of hostilities.
Unlike some historical examples where third parties were heavily involved in mediation, these negotiations seem to be driven by a more unilateral approach and potentially without full consensus from European partners either, according to NBC News.
These factors collectively differentiate the upcoming negotiations from many historical attempts to resolve conflicts through diplomacy. For example, in looking at previous examples, there was the famous Camp David Accords in 1978, which brought then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin together in a 13-day summit at Camp David, which established a way forward to a peace treaty between the two main combatants and also marked the first time that an Arab nation (Egypt) recognized Israel as a legitimate country.
Another example was the Potsdam Conference (1945). There, Joseph Stalin (Soviet Union), Winston Churchill (Great Britain, replaced by Clement Attlee), and Harry S. Truman (United States) met to discuss the end of World War II and the post-war reorganization of Europe. Then, there were the Dayton Accords (1995). Here, Presidents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a peace agreement to end the Bosnian War, with the support of US and European leaders, who were also in attendance.
Finally, there was the Good Friday Agreement (1998). This agreement, which ended three decades of nasty warfare in Northern Ireland, brought together the key leaders from both sides, along with a very active diplomatic involvement by then-US President Bill Clinton.
While these examples demonstrate the historical precedent of direct engagement at the highest levels in ending a sustained period of warfare, none of them operated in the way President Trump and Mr. Putin have put together the current negotiations for peace in Ukraine.
In the upcoming Trump-Putin summit regarding Ukraine, there are two leaders representing supposedly opposing sides scheduled to negotiate a peace settlement of a war that does not involve them in direct conflict, while prohibiting the other nation that is directly involved in the fighting from participating in the peace negotiations.This is what unilateralism and lack of consensus negotiations look like.
According to recent news reports, this is Russia’s stance: (1) The U.S. and the world must recognize and acknowledge Russia’s annexation of the Crimea territory, formerly in Ukraine (initially seized in 2014), plus the four Ukrainian regions occupied by Russia since 2022 (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) as currently and permanently part of Russia. Additionally, Russia demands that the remaining parts of these five regions that Ukraine currently has seized control of be permanently turned back over to Russia.
Secondly, Russia demands that Ukraine immediately declare itself a permanently neutral state and that Ukraine abandon any further aspirations to join NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). In addition, Ukraine must also reduce the size and capabilities of its current armed forces.
Ukraine’s position, if it were at the negotiation table, is territorial integrity. No Ukrainian recognition of any Russian territorial gains and the full withdrawal of Russian troops from Crimea and all other occupied territories. In addition, Ukraine must be allowed to seek concrete international security guarantees (whether in joining NATO or not) in order to prevent any future Russian aggression.
Ukraine is willing to discuss maintaining a neutral status in the area (not joining NATO), but in exchange it must have solid security guarantees against further Russian aggression. Ukraine will retain its goal of eventually gaining NATO membership. Finally, Ukraine demands compensation for Russian war crimes and property damage caused by the conflict.
The U.S. administration, at best, can only be a third-party arbiter in all this. It cannot force Ukraine or Russia to accept any position, though that prohibition will most likely not stop Mr. Trump from trying to do just that, especially in trying to speak for Ukraine at the table. Mr. Trump is quite capable of trying to pressure Ukraine into making concessions that will undermine Ukrainian territorial sovereignty, Ukrainian self-defense capacity, or both.
Mr. Trump will be looking for style points to burnish his virtually non-existent odds of winning a 2025 Nobel Peace Prize; he is not looking to be known as Ukraine’s champion. It’s simply another transactional exercise for his possible benefit without real merit.If, in fact, the Russian-U.S. negotiations over Ukraine do take place, the likelihood of success (particularly without Ukraine being at the table) is almost nil. But Trump will seemingly still triumph and crow.
Professor David L. Horne is founder and executive director of PAPPEI, the Pan African Public Policy and Ethical Institute, which is a new 501(c)(3) pending community-based organization or non-governmental organization (NGO). It is the stepparent organization for the California Black Think Tank which still operates and which meets every fourth Friday.
